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IBSEC-AR/7  
(USIB-D-9.5/7)  
3 October 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Security Committee  
SUBJECT : Seventh Annual Report of the Security Committee

Attached for the information of the Members is a memorandum from the USIB Secretary and a copy of the Security Committee's Seventh Annual Report which was noted by USIB on 23 September 1966.

*pull*



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Secretary

Attachment

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Group 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

USIB-D-9.5/7  
13 September 1966

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
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Seventh Annual Report of the Security Committee

1. The attached Seventh Annual Report of the Security Committee is forwarded for information of USIB members.

2. It is not now planned to schedule this report on the agenda of a USIB meeting unless specifically requested to do so by a member prior to close of business 23 September 1966. In the absence of such a request, it will be considered for record purposes that the Board noted the subject report on that date.



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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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IBSEC-AR/7  
30 August 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Seventh Annual Report of the Security Committee

There is attached for the information of the Board the Seventh Annual Report of the Security Committee. This report covers the activities of the Security Committee from 1 July 1965 through 30 June 1966.

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Howard J. Osborn  
Chairman

Attachment

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IBSEC-AR/7  
30 June 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE  
Seventh Annual Report

I. AUTHORIZATION

The USIB Security Committee operates under DCID 1/11 (New Series), effective 23 April 1965.

II. PERIOD COVERED

This report covers activities during the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.

III. OBSERVATIONS

As a result of the successful penetrations by the Soviets of U. S. security defenses, as exemplified by the cases of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Committee, in addition to preparing assessments of damage to our intelligence posture, has re-emphasized the necessity for strict compliance with existing security practices, and has attempted to secure more uniform personnel security standards for access to compartmented intelligence information.

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In the cited cases, as well as in other recent Soviet penetrations, there was no ideological motivation for cooperation with the Soviets. Treason sprang from character defects, moral turpitude, and financial need. This has prompted the Committee to urge upon all members of the intelligence community the necessity for supervisory responsibility and constant awareness that personality defects can be seized on by a hostile service as a means of penetrating the most sophisticated security defenses.

25X1A13d [REDACTED] is now used in security indoctrination programs throughout the community. The lessons to be learned from it, ranging from the need for supervisory responsibility to the necessity for maintaining high standards in investigations as well as security criteria for access to compartmented intelligence, are all matters of concern to the Committee.

#### IV. OBJECTIVES

The Committee, in its efforts to obtain uniformity in security standards throughout the intelligence community, has made substantial progress in the areas of personnel security criteria for access to our most sensitive intelligence systems as well as in the community's security processing procedures for representatives of friendly foreign intelligence services.

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The damage inflicted on our national security by [REDACTED] case has underlined for the community the validity as well as the dangers inherent in our community status. A hostile penetration of one member of the community is tantamount to a penetration of all the members, so that the necessary and helpful dissemination of intelligence throughout the community can be changed into a hazard if a recipient member has been penetrated.

The Committee is well aware of the problems faced by members of the community in achieving a uniform security posture for the protection of intelligence. Budgetary considerations, chains-of-command, administrative procedures all differ from member to member. But the problem remains a community problem, and the Committee intends to do all it can to approach it and suggest improvements as a matter of vital concern to the community.

#### V. ACTIVITIES


A. Annual Report of the Measures Taken by Members of the Intelligence Community to Enhance the Nation's Counterintelligence Posture

The annual report, covering calendar year 1965, was submitted on 30 December 1965. The change from a semi-annual to an annual report allowed greater depth of presentation, and covered such diverse

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fields as the physical security measures being taken in Viet Nam where the threat of hostile activity is directed at U. S. installations and personnel, to the increased emphasis on defensive security briefings in the light of recent hostile audio surveillance operations.



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